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Article 
On the Sociology of Patenting 
Dan L. Burk† 
  INTRODUCTION   
In a recent and somewhat controversial essay, Mark 
Lemley accuses apologists for the current intellectual property 
regime of irrationality in the face of contrary evidence.1 Lemley 
points to a range of recent empirical legal studies suggesting 
that the intellectual property regime as currently constituted 
provides little or no benefit to society, or at least provides no 
discernible net incentive for innovative or creative behavior.2 
His indictment focuses on two related responses to such stud-
ies. The first is that, in the absence of empirical evidence sup-
porting the provision of patents as an incentive to innovation, 
 
†  Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine. My 
thanks to Mark Lemley, Jessica Silbey, Laura Pedraza-Fariña, Stephanie 
Bair, Shauhin Talesh, Brenda Simon, Ted Sichelman, and participants in the 
6th Annual Patent Professor’s Workshop at the University of San Diego for 
their comments on previous versions of this work. Any remaining mistakes or 
errors are the result of commonly shared narratives that lend structure and 
meaning to social behavior. Copyright © 2016 Dan L. Burk. 
 1. Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 
1328 (2015). Early responses include James Grimmelman, Faith-Based Intel-
lectual Property: A Response, LABORATORIUM (2D SER.) (Apr. 21, 2015), http:// 
2d.laboratorium.net/post/117023858730/faith-based-intellectual-property-a 
-response; Lisa Ouellette, Lemley on Faith-Based IP, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION 
(Apr. 2, 2015, 9:59 PM), http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2015/04/lemley 
-on-faith-based-ip.html; Jeremy Sheff, Faith-Based vs. Value-Based IP: On the 
Lemley-Merges Debate, JEREMY SHEFF (Apr. 2, 2015), http://jeremysheff.com/ 
2015/04/02/faith-based-vs-value-based-ip-on-the-lemley-merges-debate; Law-
rence Solum, Lemley on Non-Consequentialist Justifications for Intellectual 
Property, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Apr. 2, 2015, 11:30 AM), http://lsolum.typepad 
.com/legaltheory/2015/04/lemley-on-non-consequentialist-justifications-for 
-intellectual-property.html. 
 2. Id. at 1334–35. 
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and in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary, substan-
tial numbers of stakeholders continue to cling to the incentive 
theory of patents and other intellectual property.3 The second is 
that, despite the apparent failure of intellectual property as a 
utilitarian enterprise, some commentators have developed al-
ternative, deontological theories to justify continued provision 
of intellectual property.4 He brands these as unconscionably 
faith-based, because their irrational pre-requisites preclude 
meaningful dialog with rational, evidence-based policymaking.5 
Lemley’s indictment of intellectual property as resting on a 
sort of secular faith would come as little surprise, and in fact as 
something as a given, to many sociologists. Certain schools of 
sociological thought have long held that much of social behav-
ior—including the modern reliance on objectivity and rationali-
ty—is based in widely accepted myths that enable coherent so-
cial functioning. In particular, the so-called “new institutional” 
school of sociology6—which, like other “new” schools of academ-
ic inquiry, has in fact been around for a good forty years—takes 
explicit account of non-rational scripts or narratives in its 
analysis of observed organizational characteristics. 
Although this was probably not the intent of Lemley’s es-
say, here I shall take his observations as a useful starting point 
for outlining a new view of what is occurring in the provision of 
intellectual property. I suggest that what he calls “faith-based” 
behaviors offer a compelling clue to certain puzzles in the ob-
served operation of intellectual property, and are themselves a 
compelling phenomenon for study. I will argue that pursuing 
such studies militates a turn in intellectual property scholar-
 
 3. Id. at 1335–36. 
 4. Id. at 1336–37. 
 5. Id. at 1346; cf. Brian L. Frye, IP as Metaphor, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 735 
(2015) (arguing that metaphors attached to intellectual property rights ob-
scure its utilitarian purposes). 
 6. Not to be confused with the “new institutional” school of economics, 
which Rob Merges and others, including myself, have argued may provide a 
useful alternate framework for understanding the economic functioning of in-
tellectual property. See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and the 
New Institutional Economics, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1857 (2000); Dan L. Burk & 
Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing Intellectual Proper-
ty Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 575 (applying prin-
ciples drawn from new institutional economics to intellectual property rights). 
Political science also has its own separate strain of new institutionalism. See 
Peter A. Hall & Rosemary C.R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms, 44 POL. STUD. 936, 947 (1996). 
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ship toward the tools of new institutional sociology, which is 
probably long overdue. Along the way I will sketch a number of 
examples from the patent field that seem to me consonant with 
a new institutional analysis, and which I suspect would prove 
fruitful sites for further investigation. I conclude with some ob-
servations regarding what a new institutional analysis of pa-
tent law might look like going forward. While my comments are 
applicable to intellectual property generally, in this Article I 
will concentrate on the patent system as a particularly fertile 
area for such analysis. 
I.  THE PATENT PUZZLE   
I should probably make clear at the outset that while I 
share Lemley’s core insight—the notion that continued adher-
ence to the virtue of intellectual property is essentially adher-
ence to a kind of myth—I accept very little else in his essay. It 
seems to me, for example, quite possible to maintain a produc-
tive dialog in which the justifications for a particular legal re-
gime differ and some of them are non-consequentialist. There 
are ongoing conversations in criminal law and tort law, for ex-
ample, where some justifications such as deterrence are utili-
tarian—and founded on fairly dubious empirical evidence—and 
other justifications such as retributivism are entirely deonto-
logical.7 It may be that the development of deontological intel-
lectual property justifications is a resort to a kind of IP jingo-
ism, adherence to the status quo at any cost, but it may also be 
part of a fairly normal jurisprudential discussion.8 
 
 7. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, Deontology, Negligence, Tort and Crime, 
76 B.U. L. REV. 273 (1996) (arguing that in tort, as in criminal law, deontolog-
ical justifications can be applied as well as utilitarian justifications). 
 8. To my mind intellectual property jurisprudence probably includes far 
too little in the way of deontological theory. Intellectual property scholarship 
seems to be fixated on Locke. See, e.g., PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY 41–72 (1996); ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY 31–67 (2011); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-
Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual 
Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993) (applying Lockean natural law theory to 
intellectual property); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 
77 GEO. L. REV. 287, 296–329 (1988). But see Carys J. Craig, Locke, Labor and 
Limiting the Author’s Right: A Warning Against a Lockean Approach to Copy-
right Law, 28 QUEEN’S L.J. 1 (2002) (arguing that Locke is inapposite to intel-
lectual property theory). The scholarship also makes occasional forays into the 
work of Kant and Hegel. See, e.g., DRAHOS, supra at 73–94 (discussing Hegel); 
MERGES, supra at 68–101 (discussing Kant); Anne Barron, Kant, Copyright 
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I am rather less interested in the rise of such non-
consequentialist rationales in intellectual property than I am in 
the continued persistence of patent incentive theory in the face 
of contrary evidence—that is, in adherence to a utilitarian ex-
planation of intellectual property despite apparent failure on 
its own terms.9 To the extent that proponents of intellectual 
property, particularly proponents of expansive intellectual 
property, rest their advocacy on a utilitarian theory of incen-
tive, there is at best very little evidence to support such a posi-
tion, and at worst a slowly growing body of evidence suggesting 
the contrary.10 Thus Lemley’s fundamental point regarding un-
provable belief in intellectual property seems to apply with 
much greater force to adamant believers in utilitarian patent 
incentives. 
The underlying disconnection is not a new one. Patenting 
has in fact looked fairly irrational for quite a long time. Viable 
justifications for patenting continue to remain at odds with 
both praxis and theory. The patent system exists, and patent-
ing continues in ever increasing volume. But curiously, the ma-
jority of patents appear to go unlicensed, unenforced, and large-
ly forgotten.11 This is all the more puzzling because patents, 
unlike many other forms of intellectual property, do not spring 
into existence spontaneously once their subject matter has tak-
en form; patents accrue only after an extended application pro-
 
and Communicative Freedom, 31 LAW & PHIL. 1 (2012); Hughes, supra at 330–
64 (discussing Hegel); Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the En-
hancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright 
Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1992) (discussing Kant and Hegel). The 
potential contributions of the majority of the Western philosophical canon—
Nietzsche, Descartes, Hume, Schopenhauer, Heidegger, Spinoza, Wittgen-
stein, Kierkegaard, etc.—remain essentially unexplored, not to mention any 
potential insights from non-European philosophical traditions. 
 9. See generally Dan L. Burk, Law and Economics of Intellectual Proper-
ty: In Search of First Principles, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 397 (2012) (review-
ing principal economic theories justifying intellectual property and their fail-
ings). 
 10. See Lemley, supra note 1, at 1332–34 (cataloging contrary evidence). 
 11. See Ann Bartow, Separating Marketing Innovation from Actual Inven-
tion: A Proposal for a New, Improved, Lighter, and Better-Tasting Form of Pa-
tent Protection, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 11 (2000); Mark A. Lemley, 
Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1503–04 
(2001). 
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cess before a federal agency.12 Firms spend significant sums ac-
quiring patents, the majority of which then go unused. Assum-
ing that the firms are behaving rationally, the expenditure of 
the costs and fees to obtain a patent must somehow be worth-
while, but there is little evidence that it is rationally justified 
by licensing income or similar returns from the patents they 
obtain. 
Several theories have been proposed to explain why patent-
ing nonetheless occurs. Commentators have noted that patents 
may serve other purposes, sometimes acting as assurances of 
quality by virtue of their governmental examination and certi-
fication; sometimes acting as funding collateral or means of fi-
nance; sometimes acting as a strategic deterrent to the threat-
ening patents of competitors.13 Most notably, some commenta-
tors, including Lemley, have argued that patents may serve as 
indicators of managerial quality, indicating to the market a 
high degree of business acumen in the firm that possesses 
them.14 In a frequently cited article, Clarissa Long has articu-
lated an elaborate model for such patent signaling, complete 
with formal economic models.15 This function is expected to de-
pend in large measure on the accuracy of patents as signals for 
a firm’s competencies, and on the comparative expense to less 
competent firms of using patents as such indicators.16 
All these alternative rationales for patenting are for the 
most part based on some sort of utility maximization; reflecting 
the dominance of neo-classical “Chicago school”17 economics in 
the American legal academy, they tend to follow rational actor 
models. All of them assume that individuals are behaving in 
some predictable, strategic way to further their material inter-
ests. Just as importantly where patents are concerned, such ra-
tionales also assume that large organizations such as corpora-
tions and universities are behaving in predictable, strategic 
 
 12. See Dan L. Burk & Jessica Reyman, Patents as Genre: A Prospectus, 
26 LAW & LIT. 163, 168 (2014). 
 13. See Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capi-
tal, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 137 (2000). 
 14. See Lemley, supra note 11, at 1505–06. 
 15. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002). 
 16. Id. at 648–50. 
 17. See generally JOHAN VAN OVERTVELDT, THE CHICAGO SCHOOL: HOW 
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ASSEMBLED THE THINKERS WHO REVOLUTION-
IZED ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS (2007) (discussing the Chicago school of eco-
nomic thought). 
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ways to further the organization’s interests. It is well under-
stood that much, if not most, patented innovation and patent 
procurement occurs in the context of large research ensembles: 
sometimes universities, but more often industrial research 
groups, or as Peter Lee reminds us, industrially funded univer-
sity research.18 
Some inroads have of course been made into strict rational 
actor assumptions. Behavioral economics, exploring and docu-
menting a variety of deviances from the rational actor para-
digm, begins to acknowledge that individuals do not always be-
have in strict accordance with the predictions of rational actor 
theory: some “irrationalities” are common or pervasive devia-
tions from welfare maximization.19 Some of the empirical work 
on patenting follows this behavioral school.20 Yet even such be-
havioral experimentation often carries the assumption that 
such quirks are aberrations from the norm, which need to be 
taken into account in order to fine-tune the rational actor mod-
el.21 There seems to be little concern that such departures from 
rational utility maximization might themselves be the norm, to 
which formally predicted rationality is instead the aberration. 
And yet there is little or no extant evidence for predicted 
outcomes of such economically rational action. For example, the 
empirical evidence for the signaling model is mixed,22 and prob-
 
 18. Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, 
and Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CAL. L. REV. 
1503, 1550–51 (2012). 
 19. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Econom-
ics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477–78 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral 
Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1175 (1997). 
 20. See, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, The Crea-
tivity Effect, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 31 (2011) (examining endowment effects); 
Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Proper-
ty: An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2010) (same). 
 21. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, 
and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1997) (arguing that rational actor models 
are robust enough to incorporate behavioral economic variations); see also 
Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: 
A Critique of Classical Law-and-Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 25 
(1989) (arguing that insights from sociology and psychology could improve ra-
ther than supplant the rational actor model). 
 22. See, e.g., Sebastian Hoenen et al., The Diminishing Signaling Value of 
Patents Between Early Rounds of Venture Capital Financing, 43 RES. POL’Y 
956, 956 (2014) (finding that small firms benefit from a patent quality signal 
only in the first, but not the second, round of start-up financing); Daniel 
Hoenig & Joachim Henkel, Quality Signals? The Role of Patents, Alliances, 
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ably tends not to support that justification—not surprisingly, 
there is evidence that investors look to more immediate signals 
of firm competence, such as managerial credentials and experi-
ence, to make judgments about the firm.23 It may of course be 
that the existing evidence is faulty. Much of the empirical work 
to which Lemley points is by its own admission preliminary; 
much of it is published within the law review system and so 
lacks the benefit of peer review. At the same time, even if the 
evidence suggesting that intellectual property law does not 
provide its purported benefits is tenuous, there is little or no 
contrary evidence to demonstrate that intellectual property law 
does in fact provide a utilitarian benefit. 
II.  NEW INSTITUTIONALISM   
If Lemley’s ultimate conclusion regarding the incommen-
surability of deontological claims seem to me suspect (and per-
haps a bit intemperate), his underlying premise, that patents 
are the opiate of the technocracy,24 seems on the contrary illu-
minating, although perhaps not quite in the way it was likely 
intended. One might say that the irrationality in the system 
runs deep, in more than one sense of the term. On Lemley’s 
view, not only are patents and other intellectual property inex-
plicable in the economically rational sense, but in the absence 
of evidence to support these models, continued adherence to 
their premises appears irrational in the colloquial sense. In 
particular, continued devotion to the incentive theory of intel-
lectual property seems purely a matter of dogma, more an act 
of faith than an act of reason.25 The fundamental premise of the 
patent system is a myth. 
In some sense this observation should not be especially 
surprising. We live in a society in which such justifying myths 
 
and Team Experience in Venture Capital Financing, 44 RES. POL’Y 1049, 1052, 
1058–61 (2015) (finding that patents are valued for their exclusivity, not as a 
signal); Dirk Czarnitzki et al., Patents as Quality Signals? The Implications 
for Financing Constraints on R&D 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 19947, 2014) (finding that small firms, but not large firms, benefit 
from a patent quality signal). 
 23. See Hoenig & Henkel, supra note 22, at 1053–54. 
 24. See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1336. 
 25. See id. at 1337. 
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are frequent, ubiquitous, and pervasive26: hard work pays off in 
the end, all men are created equal, free enterprise leads to 
prosperity, honesty is the best policy, and untold similar cul-
tural tropes are generally and reflexively assumed in social ac-
tion. Countless millions rely, consciously or unconsciously, on 
these attitudes in structuring their most routine conduct, alt-
hough the veracity of the premises is at least suspect. Most 
such assumptions are probably wrong at some level, and many 
seem demonstrably false. Certainly very few such assumptions 
are likely to be empirically verified. Faith-based intellectual 
property has plenty of faith-based company. 
Such pervasive, dogmatic irrationalities have not gone un-
noticed by those who study social behavior, and in particular by 
those who study organizational behavior.27 Much of the impetus 
of the new institutional literature is an attempt to escape the 
stylized rational actor models prevalent not only in neoclassical 
economic thinking, but appearing as a disciplinary spillover in 
other areas of social science.28 In particular, new institutional-
ists have resisted ascribing economically rational action to so-
cial organizations such as business firms or state agencies, 
which have no intrinsic motivations or expectations, but rather 
display the emergent conglomerate action of their constituent 
members.29 Regarded as complex social entities, such organiza-
 
 26. See Roger Friedland & Robert P. Alford, Bringing Society Back in: 
Symbols, Practices, and Institutional Contradictions, in THE NEW INSTITU-
TIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 232, 249 (Walter W. Powell & Paul 
J. DiMaggio eds., 1991) (describing the social relationship between symbolic 
systems and material practices). 
 27. As Nobel laureate Douglass North observes, for example: 
It is necessary to dismantle the rationality assumption underlying 
economic theory in order to approach constructively the nature of 
human learning. History demonstrates that ideas, ideologies, myths, 
dogmas, and prejudices matter; and an understanding of the way they 
evolve is necessary for further progress in developing a framework to 
understand societal change. 
Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, in THE NEW INSTI-
TUTIONALISM IN SOCIOLOGY 247, 250 (Mary C. Brinton & Victor Nee eds., 
1998). 
 28. Julia Black, New Institutionalism and Naturalism in Socio-Legal 
Analysis: Institutionalist Approaches to Regulatory Decision-Making, 19 LAW 
& POL’Y 51, 61 (1997); Martha Finnemore, Norms, Culture, and World Politics: 
Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism, 50 INT. ORG. 325, 329 (1996). 
 29. See Marietta Baba et al., New Institutional Approaches to Formal Or-
ganizations, in A COMPANION TO ORGANIZATIONAL ANTHROPOLOGY 74, 90 (D. 
Douglas Caulkins & Ann T. Jordan eds., 2013). 
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tions may be viewed as instead existing according to certain 
scripts or myths that mediate the interaction of their constitu-
ent membership with the larger ecology of social actors.30 
Note that the term “myth” is used here not so much in the 
colloquial sense of a fantasy or falsehood (although they may 
indeed be such) but rather to designate pervasive social under-
standings or ideologies that bind communities together31—
recalling in some ways Mircea Eliade’s definition, in a different 
context, of myth as a story that is true but not factual.32 The 
myths contemplated by new institutionalism constitute accept-
ed tropes or narratives that articulate socially accepted ration-
ales for achieving desired ends.33 These rationales are imple-
mented as organizational structures; organizations then 
become sites for enacting and re-enacting the ceremonial para-
digms and ideologies prevalent in their social environment.34 
Such ceremonial behavior is sufficiently ingrained in social 
behavior that it becomes nearly invisible, but the adoption of 
ceremonial trappings in conformity with social myths is fairly 
common, as are the sequelae that flow from such conformities. 
Everyday examples offer familiar illustrations of how social 
ceremonies work. A white coat and stethoscope are part of the 
ceremonial garb of the modern Westernized physician.35 There 
is no particular reason that the coat need be white; it might 
just as well have been pink or green, but white is the conven-
tion that modern Western societies have settled on as the trope 
indicating medical expertise. Neither does the white coat and 
stethoscope convey any substantive information about the com-
 
 30. See John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: 
Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340, 340 (1977). 
 31. See generally ROLAND BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES (Annette Lavers 
trans., 1972) (exploring the structure and significance of modern cultural 
myths). 
 32. See MIRCEA ELIADE, MYTH AND REALITY 5–8 (Willard R. Trask trans., 
1963). 
 33. See Meyer & Rowan, supra note 30, at 344. Some work has attempted 
to avoid the popular connotations of the term “myth” by using the term “insti-
tutional logic.” See, e.g., Friedland & Alford, supra note 26, at 248 (describing 
the symbolism associated with society’s expression of values). 
 34. See Meyer & Rowan, supra note 30, at 346. 
 35. Cf. Lenny Bernstein, Heart Doctors Are Listening for Clues to the Fu-
ture of Their Stethoscopes, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2016), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/heart-doctors-are-listening-for 
-clues-to-the-future-of-their-stethoscopes/2016/01/02/bd73b000-a98d-11e5 
-8058-480b572b4aae_story.html (“The stethoscope is also an icon, of course.”). 
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petence of the wearer; the wearer may be highly accomplished 
or may instead be a quack. Indeed, an accountant or a plumber 
with no medical training might well command a good deal of 
deference simply by donning a white coat and walking around a 
hospital. 
Social tropes and ceremonies very commonly change the 
structure of the organizations they permeate. Once the white 
coat comes into use, it may be incumbent on physicians to ac-
quire one, whether or not the garment is actually germane to 
the duties they perform. Further, once white coats have been 
adopted, certain ancillary changes to hospitals and clinics will 
inevitably follow: vendors will vie to supply white coats, medi-
cal providers will need to make provision for their purchase and 
distribution, medical facilities will need to install hooks and 
hangers for their storage, and to provide laundry services for 
their cleaning. It may even make sense to regulate their use in 
order to prevent fraud or misperceptions, requiring white coats 
under some circumstances or forbidding them at others. The 
white coat becomes institutionalized in a particularly social 
sense of the word. 
A. UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONS 
The use of the term “institution” as I have just employed it 
requires some explanation, as in new institutionalism it consti-
tutes a term of art. As its name implies, new institutionalism is 
concerned with the nature and action of institutions, but this 
entails meanings different than either those of colloquial usage 
or those of usage in other disciplines. As considered by new in-
stitutional sociology, institutions are emergent and generalized 
systems of factors that constrain individual action and produce 
regular patterns of behavior without being repeatedly mobi-
lized to do so.36 Thus the concept of “institution” is fairly broad 
and somewhat ambiguous, including a wide range of social ar-
rangements.37 One prominent commentator has defined the 
concept as comprising the “cognitive, normative, and regulative 
 
 36. See Ronald L. Jepperson, Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Insti-
tutionalism, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 
143, 145 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991). 
 37. See John W. Meyer et al., Ontology and Rationalization in the Western 
Cultural Account, in INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS: 
STRUCTURAL COMPLEXITY AND INDIVIDUALISM 9, 10 (W. Richard Scott et al. 
eds., 1994). 
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structures and activities . . . that provide stability and meaning 
to social behavior.”38 
New institutionalism incorporates a strong “cognitive turn” 
in sociology, asserting that social institutions provide scripts 
and behavioral models that do not merely define proper behav-
ior, but by which individuals construct social realities.39 Institu-
tions provide the frames that guide human action, defining the 
universe of conceivable behaviors in a given situation.40 Institu-
tional tropes both allow individuals to recognize a given situa-
tion and supply the proper scripts with which to react.41 The 
terminology of the theater stage, such as “script,” used to de-
scribe institutionalism is quite deliberate; as social actors enter 
into particular social roles they both adopt and reinforce the so-
cially appropriate scripts that structure their behavior.42 
Thus, institutions may be best identified by what they do, 
rather than by particular forms or categories. Institutions de-
fine what preferences and goals are acceptable and socially 
sanctioned.43 They prompt reciprocally typified instances of 
habitualized behavior; that is to say, they constitute shared 
meanings or understandings linked to particular customary 
behaviors.44 Such behaviors are developed to address recurring 
problems, and are invoked almost automatically in response to 
particular situations.45 These customary patterns of behavior 
are viewed by their adherents, when they think about them at 
all, as essential, indispensable, and commonplace; consequently 
they serve as important sources of social stability.46 
 
 38. W. RICHARD SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 33 (1995). 
 39. Hall & Taylor, supra note 6, at 948. 
 40. See MARY DOUGLAS, HOW INSTITUTIONS THINK 4 (1986); Hall & Tay-
lor, supra note 6. 
 41. See Hall & Taylor, supra note 6, at 948. 
 42. See John W. Meyer, Reflections on Institutional Theories of Organiza-
tions, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL INSTITUTIONALISM 790, 
794 (Royston Greenwood et al. eds., 2008). 
 43. See Black, supra note 28, at 68. 
 44. See PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUC-
TION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 54 (1967). 
 45. See Pamela S. Tolbert & Lynne G. Zucker, The Institutionalization of 
Institutional Theory, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATION STUDIES 175, 180 
(Stewart R. Clegg et al. eds., 1996). 
 46. Cf. Lynne G. Zucker, The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Per-
sistence, 42 AM. SOC. REV. 726 (1977) (analyzing the relationship between in-
stitutionalization and generational uniformity, maintenance, and resistance). 
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Perhaps most importantly, the term “institution” in this 
parlance is not synonymous with the term “organization,” but 
rather designates ambient norms and conventions that have 
become social fixtures, lending them legitimacy.47 Such cultural 
constructs or scripts may be reflected in structural organiza-
tions.48 A key tenet of new institutionalism is that localized in-
dividual and organizational actions are influenced by institu-
tions that operate in a wider environment.49 Thus the level of 
analysis for new institutionalism is that of the organizational 
field, which might also be termed the arena of action.50 The 
field comprises a community of disparate organizations that 
engage in common activities subject to similar influences.51 
Fields are often contested, incorporating competing interests, 
and gain stability by organizing around well-defined patterns of 
behavior that exert homogenizing pressures on the constituent 
organizations.52 Thus the social rules and practices that are 
pervasive throughout an organization’s field set the framework 
for the organization’s structure and outlook.53 
B. ORGANIZATIONS 
Much of the impetus for new institutionalism has been in-
vestigation of the similarities, or isomorphisms, of organiza-
tions in diverse settings.54 New institutionalists consider the or-
igins of organizational templates, their promulgation, and their 
transformations.55 Rational actor models assert that organiza-
tions develop particular characteristics in response to market 
 
 47. See Black, supra note 28, at 57. 
 48. See Edwin Amenta & Kelly M. Ramsey, Institutional Theory, in 
HANDBOOK OF POLITICS: STATE AND SOCIETY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 15, 19 
(Kevin T. Leicht & J. Craig Jenkins eds., 2010). 
 49. See Meyer, supra note 42, at 790. 
 50. See id. at 792. 
 51. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: 
Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 
48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 147 (1983). 
 52. See Andrew J. Hoffman, Institutional Evolution and Change: Envi-
ronmentalism and the U.S. Chemical Industry, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 351, 357 
(1999). 
 53. See Black, supra note 28, at 57–58. 
 54. See Thomas B. Lawrence & Masoud Shadnam, Institutional Theory, in 
5 THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMMUNICATION 2289, 2290 (Wolf-
gang Donsbach ed., 2008). 
 55. See SCOTT, supra note 38, at 44. 
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forces that require competitive efficiency, implying that similar 
structures are a response to the dictates of efficiency. But new 
institutionalists largely reject the notion that organizational 
decisions and resultant behaviors constitute a rational re-
sponse to achieve efficiency in the face of external stimuli.56 
Rather, new institutionalism holds that organizations 
make decisions, not necessarily to solve existing problems or to 
further functional needs, but out of the convergence of oppor-
tunity, strategic interests, and internal and external influences. 
Some new institutionalists have addressed this irregular mé-
lange of discordant factors that has been dubbed the “garbage 
can” model of organizational decision-making.57 These analyses 
observe uncertainty rather than rationality leading to deci-
sions, and just as often observe it leading to non-decisions or 
failures to act.58 New institutionalist approaches suggest that 
organizations deal with uncertainty by adopting accepted rou-
tines that are regarded as stable and legitimate.59 Such readily 
available models, pervasive throughout a given field, may be 
supplied by a variety of exogenous sources, particularly by law, 
by culture, or by professional expertise. 
Thus new institutionalism has been particularly concerned 
with the way that organizational structures are shaped by reg-
ulation, normative custom, and pervasive social scripts.60 This 
set of influences has been designated by some as coercive, mi-
metic, and normative.61 In the first category are formal or in-
formal pressures from outside the organization: the state or 
other cultural institutions may impose requirements on organi-
zations that make them resemble one another.62 Second, organ-
izations may come to resemble one another because leaders or 
managers consciously imitate models seen in other organiza-
tions—in particular, professionals within organizations, such 
 
 56. See NILS BRUNSSON, THE IRRATIONAL ORGANIZATION: IRRATIONALITY 
AS A BASIS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL ACTION AND CHANGE 3–4 (1985); Black, su-
pra note 28, at 59. 
 57. E.g., Michael D. Cohen et al., A Garbage Can Model of Organizational 
Choice, 17 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1 (1972). 
 58. See Meyer, supra note 42, at 789. 
 59. See Black, supra note 28, at 60. 
 60. See Walter W. Powell & Jeannette Anastasia Colyvas, New Institu-
tionalism, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ORGANIZATION STUDIES 975, 
976 (Stewart R. Clegg & James R. Bailey eds., 2008). 
 61. See, e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 51, at 150. 
 62. See id. 
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as attorneys, accountants, or managers may draw on educa-
tional or professional knowledge to provide mimetic struc-
tures.63 Organizations may also resemble one another due to 
norms or social obligations that have been internalized by their 
constituents.64 
Of particular interest here is the organizational adoption of 
policies, structures, and programs in order to align themselves 
with dominant social myths. In many cases this is not a calcu-
lated decision; it is simply accepted as the way things are 
properly done.65 In a more deliberative mode, organizations 
may be seeking social conformity through ceremonial or sym-
bolic practices that communicate legitimacy to their various 
constituencies.66 Ambient social rituals and symbols may be 
mobilized strategically to legitimate particular ends.67 Many 
organizational structures implement ceremonial functions in-
tended to demonstrate the organization’s acceptance and adop-
tion of external values. 
One implication of this approach is that formal structures 
may be not only functional, but also symbolic, signaling an or-
ganization’s investment in shared social narratives and expec-
tations.68 Indeed, the adoption of structures or practices may 
not be dictated by the organization’s goals or by its functions, 
but rather by the need for legitimacy and social order. The 
structures and policies adopted may not necessarily be more ef-
ficient in the functional sense of furthering the organization’s 
operations, but they are determined responses to the social en-
vironment.69 Satisfying institutionalized myths may take prec-
edence over functionality.70 
For example, as Meyer and Rowan observed nearly forty 
years ago in their germinal article on institutional myths,71 re-
 
 63. See id. at 151. 
 64. See id. at 152. 
 65. See Friedland & Alford, supra note 26, at 254. 
 66. See James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Or-
ganizational Factors in Political Life, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 742 (1984). 
 67. See Black, supra note 28, at 69; Friedland & Alford, supra note 26, at 
254. 
 68. See Lauren Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Or-
ganizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531, 1567–68 
(1992); Lawrence & Shadnam, supra note 54, at 2289–90. 
 69. See Lawrence & Shadnam, supra note 54. 
 70. See Meyer & Rowan, supra note 30, at 340–41. 
 71. Id. 
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search and development programs may in fact produce research 
and development, but that is perhaps the least of their institu-
tional functions. Such programs also signal the propriety, au-
thenticity, sobriety, and competiveness of the firm. Serious, re-
spectable, innovative firms have research and development 
programs; firms without a research and development program 
are unattractive prospects for investment or employment. The 
rationale or social trope for research and development pro-
grams may be that they will produce new and innovative prod-
ucts or methods, yielding a competitive advantage, and a firm 
that is not at least trying to generate such advantages may be 
less competitive. But regardless of what a given research and 
development program actually produces, the lack of a program 
may be viewed with suspicion by shareholders, investors, cus-
tomers, and other constituencies within the firm’s field. 
Similarly, some studies show corporations adopt formal 
procedures for employee due process both to mollify potentially 
disgruntled employees and to show good-faith compliance with 
regulatory requirements.72 Employers who comply with such 
expectations are more likely to secure government contracts or 
grants, attract qualified workers, and deflect regulatory scruti-
ny.73 Indeed, the survival and success of organizations may be 
dependent on the adoption of structures that signal social par-
ticipation and conformity, rather than dependent on the organ-
ization’s actual functions or performance.74 By incorporating 
the rationalized narratives of its surrounding community, the 
organization reflects collective values, garners social approval, 
and deflects criticism or adverse scrutiny. This serves to pro-
mote the stability, survival, and success of an organization by 
aligning both internal and external constituencies with perva-
sive social scripts. 
At the same time, this influential dynamic flows in both di-
rections, meaning that the institutional tropes within an organ-
izational field also influence law or regulation relevant to that 
field. Managerial practices and assumptions influence the way 
 
 72. See Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: 
Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406, 406 (1999); John 
Sutton et al., The Legalization of the Workplace, 99 AM. J. SOC. 944, 946 
(1994). 
 73. See Edelman, supra note 68, at 1542. 
 74. See Meyer & Rowan, supra note 30, at 352; Tolbert & Zucker, supra 
note 45, at 178. 
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in which organizations understand law and compliance with 
the law.75 These logics spread from organization to organization 
within the organizational field by mimesis, by professional 
networking, and by other educational exchanges. Eventually 
they become routinized background assumptions that are taken 
for granted. Courts frequently adopt or defer to custom in an 
industry.76 Legislatures similarly incorporate the routine prac-
tices of organizational fields into the regulations governing that 
field.77 Thus recent research has shown in a number of circum-
stances how these routinized understandings of law shape the 
content and meaning of judicial decisions and legislation.78 
C. LOOSE COUPLING 
As I have described, new institutionalism posits the cere-
monial adoption of organizational functions, either as a matter 
of course, or to conform to expectations in the field. At the same 
time, it is well understood that there is likely to be a gap be-
tween social expectation and actual practice, between the myth 
and reality.79 The signal sent by ceremonial adoption of a pro-
gram or organizational structure may be pure façade, having 
little to do with the organization’s actual working functions. 
Pervasive myths or tropes may be necessary to legitimacy and 
cohesion, but because they are not necessarily grounded in the 
actual function of an organization, they may be detrimental to 
smooth or efficient operation of the organization. Ceremonial 
compliance may divert resources from core functions, or in 
 
 75. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the 
Managerialization of Law, 106 AM. J. SOC. 1589 (2001) (analyzing managerial 
practices relating to diversity); Anna-Maria Marshall, Idle Rights: Employees’ 
Rights Consciousness and the Construction of Sexual Harassment Policies, 39 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 83 (2005) (arguing that managerial practices relating to 
sexual harassment limit protection for women). 
 76. See Lauren B. Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule: Judicial Def-
erence to Institutionalized Employment Structures, 117 AM. J. SOC. 888, 889 
(2011). 
 77. See Shauhin A. Talesh, Institutional and Political Sources of Legisla-
tive Change: Explaining How Private Organizations Influence the Form and 
Content of Consumer Protection Legislation, 39 L. & SOC. INQ. 973, 973 (2014). 
 78. See Lauren B. Edelman, Overlapping Fields and Constructed Legali-
ties: The Endogeneity of Law, in PRIVATE EQUITY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
AND THE DYNAMICS OF CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION 55, 81–90 (Justin 
O’Brien ed., 2007). 
 79. See Meyer & Rowan, supra note 30, at 356. 
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some cases may demand actions that are diametrically opposed 
to those that would further an organization’s actual work.80 
Consequently, new institutionalism predicts that at times 
there may be a dissociation between actual practice and social 
convention, allowing both to simultaneously exist without con-
flict. Organizations may accomplish this by instituting only a 
“loose coupling” between the social narratives by which they os-
tensibly operate and the actual procedures and systems under 
which they in fact operate.81 Such loose coupling between the 
real and the ideal allows both myth and reality to co-exist in 
the same organization, by paying lip service to the proper social 
script while essential organizational activity proceeds separate-
ly.82 Compliance with the prevailing myth may exist in parallel 
with de facto disregard of the social trope, and even alongside 
outright noncompliance.83 
Indeed, where an organization has bifurcated social scripts 
from its actual operations, full implementation of the social 
scripts may precipitate a crisis within the organization, crip-
pling its regular functions. For example, detailed ethnographic 
study of one public school highlighted the loose coupling be-
tween actual administrative practice in the school and the per-
vasive public rhetoric of teacher accountability and student as-
sessment.84 Although the school was by necessity required to 
adopt and repeat the public tropes related to education, these 
were in practice largely ignored and given largely superficial lip 
service, while teachers instead focused on actual student needs 
and learning.85 Subsequent attempts to more tightly align 
school practice with the tropes of accountability and assess-
ment disrupted the normal teaching and learning mechanisms 
of the school, creating chaos and dysfunction and leading to a 
 
 80. Cf. Karl E. Weick, Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Sys-
tems, 21 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1, 1–3 (1976) (noting that in some “loosely coupled” 
systems, there may be little relationship between an organization’s goals and 
its methods). 
 81. See Meyer, supra note 42, at 802–03. 
 82. See Kimberly D. Elsbach & Robert I. Sutton, Acquiring Organization-
al Legitimacy Through Illegitimate Actions: A Marriage of Institutional and 
Impression Management Theories, 35 ACAD. MGMT. J. 699, 699 (1992). 
 83. See Weick, supra note 80, at 7. 
 84. See Tim Hallett, The Myth Incarnate: Recoupling Processes, Turmoil, 
and Inhabited Institutions in an Urban Elementary School, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 
52 (2010). 
 85. Id. at 59–62. 
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breakdown of not only the routine functions of the school, but of 
the outcomes that were ostensibly expected to proceed from ac-
countability and assessment.86 
III.  RATIONALITY REDUX   
The new institutional emphasis is on socially compliant 
behavior, and while this is taken as a separate question from 
that of economic rationality, the sociological analysis is not 
necessarily entirely divorced from the concept of rationality—at 
least, not from rationality of a certain type. Some commenta-
tors have begun exploring this territory between new institu-
tionalism and rational action, relying on concepts of bounded 
rationality that assume actors behave rationally under con-
straints of limited information and immediacy.87 Social scripts 
and myths might be said to set the bounds within which an ac-
tor behaves. And, as I have mentioned previously, at the organ-
izational level, adopting the social scripts prevalent in the field 
might be viewed as rational, even strategic, in the sense that 
an organization which signals social compliance is more likely 
to attract resources and attain a stable position that allows it to 
survive.88 
But the rationality of social institutionalism is not the ra-
tionality of neo-classical economics. New institutional rationali-
ty is not merely bounded, but so bounded as to lie nearly out of 
the bounds contemplated by economic analysis. Rational eco-
nomic action has been defined as choosing the best means to 
achieve the chooser’s ends.89 But new institutionalism recogniz-
es that the chooser’s preferences and the acceptable means do 
not exist independently; they are the result of the same social 
environment that defines both what is desirable and which 
means are “best.”90 Institutional influences define both what is 
desirable and how desires are satisfied. For example, within an 
organization, the individual’s position and responsibilities will 
tend to define his or her preferences.91 An individual’s prefer-
 
 86. Id. at 62–66. 
 87. E.g., Victor Nee, Sources of the New Institutionalism, in THE NEW IN-
STITUTIONALISM IN SOCIOLOGY 1, 10–12 (Mary C. Brinton & Victor Nee eds., 
1998). 
 88. See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text. 
 89. See Posner, supra note 21, at 1551. 
 90. See Friedland & Alford, supra note 26, at 233–34. 
 91. See id. 
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ences, which undergird her rational choices, are not only 
bounded but defined by social influences and relationships to 
other actors.92 
Stated differently, new institutionalism views both ration-
ality and efficiency as socially constructed concepts.93 Thus the 
cognitive basis for new institutionalism posits individuals act-
ing rationally, not necessarily in the sense of advancing their 
material well-being, but in the sense of defining and expressing 
their identities in socially appropriate ways.94 Organizational 
responses and structures that become institutionalized within 
an organizational field come be to be seen as rational. The new 
institutional inquiry is not whether a given activity optimizes 
either personal or social welfare; the question is instead wheth-
er there is an acceptable legitimizing explanation for the activi-
ty. The explanation offered for a given behavior may well be the 
purported optimization of personal or social welfare, but it is 
the acceptability of the story, rather than its objective effect, 
that is important. Thus the actors of the new institutionalism 
are less rational utility maximizers than they are maximal util-
ity rationalizers. 
This is not to say that efficiency and market forces play no 
role in the structure or behavior of organizations, only to say 
that these are at best one component in a complex matrix of in-
fluences on such institutions. Meyer and Rowan suggest that 
the relative influence of market efficiency and social narratives 
may be determined by the type of production and the outputs in 
different sectors;95 Tolbert and Zucker suggest that both market 
influences and social influences are likely to be present in dif-
ferent measures in different situations at different times.96 
Moreover, adherence to the prevailing script may be to some 
extent a self-fulfilling prophecy: investors are more likely to in-
vest in a firm that is behaving properly innovatively, thus 
providing it with the resources that could in fact foster innova-
tion. Innovative employees may gravitate to firms that follow 
the innovation script, imbuing the firm with the talent needed 
for engaging in actual innovation. Customers seeking innova-
 
 92. See Black, supra note 28, at 64. 
 93. See Finnemore, supra note 28. 
 94. See Hall & Taylor, supra note 6, at 949. 
 95. Meyer & Rowan, supra note 30, at 354. 
 96. Tolbert & Zucker, supra note 45. 
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tive solutions may buy from firms perceived as innovative, 
spurring the firm to supply innovative products. 
But as the literature on loose coupling suggests, social im-
peratives and efficiency may conflict with one another, dictat-
ing opposing organizational structures and incompatible re-
source allocation. An organization that is wholly indifferent to 
the efficiency of its functions is likely not long for this world, 
but it seems nonetheless clear that a highly efficient organiza-
tion that lacks the trust and approval of its associated constitu-
encies is also not long for this world. At the same time, highly 
inefficient organizations that have gained social respect and 
validation may endure a very long time indeed. Indeed, the 
framework of institutional legitimacy offers a plausible theory 
as to the survival of any number of inefficient political, social, 
and business organizations that would otherwise be expected to 
have failed and disappeared long ago.97 
IV.  NEW INSTITUTIONAL PATENTING   
As Professor Lemley observes, patents seem not to fit well 
into economic incentive models.98 But they may prove a better 
fit to the parameters of new institutionalism that I have de-
scribed above. New institutional approaches offer two charac-
teristic features that may be of particular use in considering 
the social role of patents. First, new institutional analysis fo-
cuses on the distinctive qualities of organizations, and that 
seems clearly the correct level of scrutiny for patenting behav-
ior. Patent scholarship has tended to focus on behavior at the 
individual, rather than the corporate level,99 but patents are 
overwhelmingly obtained, held, and enforced by organizations, 
 
 97. See MARSHALL W. MEYER & LYNNE G. ZUCKER, PERMANENTLY FAIL-
ING ORGANIZATIONS 45 (1989). 
 98. See Lemley, supra note 1, at 1337. 
 99. For example, commentators such as Stephanie Bair and Greg Mandel 
have canvassed the psychological literature to assess its consonance with in-
centive theory and other justifications for patenting, but primarily at the level 
of individual rather than organizational behaviors. See Stephanie Plamondon 
Bair, The Psychology of Patent Protection, 48 CONN. L. REV. 297 (2015) (dis-
cussing patent incentives’ psychological effects on individuals); Gregory N. 
Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law and the 
Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999 (2011) (discussing the 
patent system’s effect on individual creativity). 
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typically corporations or universities.100 New institutionalism 
moves the conversation further in the direction begun by 
Stephanie Bair, who has argued that the corporate-social mi-
lieu must be taken into account in assessing the efficacy of the 
incentive rationale for intellectual property,101 or by Julie Co-
hen, who has shown how intellectual property is a form of 
property best viewed as an incentive to the corporate entity, not 
the individual.102 
Of course the prevalent discourse on intellectual property 
is not couched in terms of corporate property, but is perfused 
instead by the myth of the solitary genius who is motivated and 
rewarded for his efforts.103 And that brings us to the second use-
ful feature of new institutionalism, which is its orientation to-
ward assessing the effects of those myths that are prevalent in 
the field. Jessica Silbey has already gestured in this direction 
in pioneering work on the power of narrative in justifying intel-
lectual property allocations.104 A new institutional approach 
pushes such observations a step further, suggesting the prima-
cy of narrative for organizational behaviors and structures in-
volving intellectual property in general, and patents in particu-
lar.105 
Taking such myths seriously suggests that patent law 
shapes preferences and structures social action,106 but not nec-
essarily in the manner contemplated under the myth of incen-
 
 100. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empir-
ical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2117 (2000); 
Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 615 (2008). 
 101. Stephanie Bair, Employee Creativity, YOUTUBE (Dec. 10, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m9ZFvBncAzw&app. 
 102. Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: 
A Research Agenda, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 141, 143 (characterizing intellectual 
property as an incentive for capital rather than an incentive for creativity). 
 103. See Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 
709, 709 (2012). 
 104. See Jessica Silbey, The Mythical Beginnings of Intellectual Property, 
15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 319 (2008); see also Frye, supra note 5 (critiquing in-
tellectual property tropes). 
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doctrine. Kevin Emerson Collins, Semiotics 101: Taking the Printed Matter 
Doctrine Seriously, 85 IND. L.J. 1379 (2010). Here the patent itself becomes a 
social signifier. Cf. BARTHES, supra note 31, at 111–26 (explaining the semiot-
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 106. See Black, supra note 28, at 75. 
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tive to innovate. Rather, patent law carries a narrative as to 
what is socially acceptable or desirable; patent acquisition is 
then either routinely accepted as what organizations ought to 
do, or may even be instrumentally deployed to signal conformi-
ty with that narrative.107 In either case, acquisition of patents 
appears strongly ceremonial, demonstrating organizational ad-
herence to prevalent narratives of innovation, competition, and 
success. Patents may demonstrate to venture capitalists, 
shareholders, creditors, and other constituencies that the firm 
is behaving as it ought. Patent acquisition may satisfy these 
constituencies that the firm is technologically progressive and 
innovative, worthy of the trust that investment or employment 
entails. 
On this theory, acquisition of patents sends a type of signal 
to competitors, employees, and investors, and so may seem 
reminiscent of the Long signaling model of patents as an indi-
cator of a firm’s qualities.108 But new institutionalism cautions 
that adherence to cultural myths is not necessarily a signal re-
garding a firm’s actual or functional qualities, and certainly not 
a signal of economic efficiency.109 Rather, the signal in question 
here is a social or ceremonial signal, not an economic one. The 
signal is one of compliance and reputability, an indication of 
participation in the expected social order. Patents serve as a to-
ken of such compliance because they are integral to the perva-
sive narrative of innovation, of competence, of competitiveness. 
The firm may or may not in fact be innovative, competent, or 
competitive, but that is largely beside the point: holding pa-
tents demonstrates its adoption of the proper role in the proper 
social script. 
This may go a considerable way toward explaining certain 
puzzles involving patents, such as the puzzle of start-up financ-
ing. As I have mentioned above, it seems clear as a factual mat-
ter that before investing in a start-up technology firm, venture 
capitalists like the firm to hold patents.110 Exactly why venture 
 
 107. Cf. William Hubbard, Inventing Norms, 44 CONN. L. REV. 369, 374–88 
(2011) (collecting examples of positive social attitudes towards patents and in-
novation). 
 108. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. 
 109. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text. 
 110. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
  
2016] ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF PATENTING 443 
 
capitalists prefer to see patents is more of a mystery.111 Econo-
mists looking at the question have searched for some efficiency 
rationale, such as signals of management competency; the re-
sults of such investigations are equivocal.112 The most straight-
forward explanation may simply be the new institutional sug-
gestion that venture capitalists look for patents as a marker of 
innovation because patents are what innovative firms are sup-
posed to have. This is of course somewhat tautological; but to 
the extent that patents embody a social trope of innovation that 
is pervasive throughout the field, the tautology would come as 
no surprise to new institutionalists. 
A rather different type of patent signaling has been sug-
gested by some commentators drawing from the larger scholar-
ly literature on expressive law.113 This literature suggests that 
one function of legal imperatives, particularly in areas such as 
constitutional and criminal law, is to communicate certain val-
ues, whether or not the law is successful in directly altering 
behavior. Some patent scholars have suggested that certain pa-
tent doctrines may accomplish similar goals; for example, oth-
erwise ineffective limitations on patentable subject matter 
might serve to legitimate patent law by communicating to a 
skeptical public certain limitations and aspirations on the am-
bit of the patent system.114 This is a rather different type of ex-
pression than that contemplated by new institutionalism, alt-
hough the state is certainly an organization permeated by 
social institutions. Examination of the patent field might well 
reveal parallels in adoption of patent tropes by the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office or other agencies such as 
the United States Trade Representative. 
Related to its consideration of social scripts, and its em-
phasis on organizational replication, is new institutionalism’s 
rejection of the rational actor models that have dominated eco-
 
 111. See Jessica Silbey, Patent Variation: Discerning Diversity Among Pa-
tent Functions, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 441, 459 (2013) (discussing ethnographic 
data from patent practitioners indicating that patents are an “empty place-
holder” for some value criterion investors are seeking). 
 112. See id. 
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nomics and related social sciences.115 This strikes me as an ad-
ditionally appealing feature of the new institutional approach, 
recognizing that even if individuals behave as economically ra-
tional actors—a dubious proposition—there is no reason to be-
lieve that the emergent behavior of organizations, constituting 
groups of such individuals, will necessarily be in any sense eco-
nomically rational. This in turn suggests that there is no rea-
son to believe that the observed behavior of corporations, uni-
versities, or other organizations in procuring, holding, or 
enforcing patents will be either coherent or rational. Since 
there is little evidence that patenting behavior is rational in 
the sense predicted by rational actor models, it may be time for 
models that are not dependent on such assumptions. Ceremo-
nial patenting is an excellent candidate for such an explanation 
that is coherent with other observed activity of large organiza-
tions. 
At the same time, note that none of this necessarily pre-
cludes patents from acting, at least sometimes, as an incentive 
to innovation, nor for that matter of acting sometimes as a sig-
nal as to managerial quality and the like.116 A white coat and a 
stethoscope are integral to the cultural persona of the physi-
cian, but no doubt the coat does protect the wearer’s street 
clothes from stains, and nothing stops the physician from using 
an otherwise ceremonial stethoscope for diagnostic purposes 
when appropriate. No doubt once one has a stack of ceremonial 
patents, they can be sometimes put to use as collateral, or de-
ployed as a litigation deterrent, or engaged in the myriad other 
ways that commentators have suggested patents may be 
used.117 
A. LOOSE COUPLING 
Patent convention and actual practice may also entail ex-
actly the type of loose coupling predicted and explained under 
new institutionalism.118 Such effects are perhaps most striking 
in the case of university technology transfer offices. Since the 
Reagan-era passage of the Stevenson Technology Transfer Act 
and the Bayh-Dole Act, universities have been permitted and 
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encouraged to retain ownership of patents arising from federal 
research funding.119 Major research institutions have estab-
lished technology transfer offices to manage the acquisition and 
licensing of such patents.120 This seems a sensible reaction to 
the accumulation of patents in universities, but presents a fis-
cal puzzle. Empirical evidence suggests that university tech-
nology transfer seldom results in appreciable income for the 
university, and technology transfer offices in many cases will 
consume more resources than they generate.121 Logically, in 
terms of money spent and money earned, one might expect uni-
versities to forgo patent acquisition. And yet such programs are 
common.122 
This may be due to loose coupling between the functional 
and mythical structures of universities. Patents and associated 
technology transfer structures may be playing a separate, cer-
emonial, non-pecuniary role for research universities. Public 
universities are under perennial pressure to justify their con-
sumption of taxpayer subsidies. Private universities are not 
free from such pressures, having to justify their activities to 
alumni and to philanthropic donors, a fundraising imperative 
that public universities increasingly share. The existence of a 
technology transfer office allows universities to demonstrate 
that the university is “giving back” to the community, stimulat-
ing local business and economic growth by moving the fruits of 
research into the commercial sector. Tech transfer programs al-
 
 119. See DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVA-
TION: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE 
BAYH-DOLE ACT IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2004); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Ei-
senberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 290 (2003); Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, 
University Licensing and the Bayh-Dole Act, 301 SCIENCE 1052, 1052 (2003). 
 120. See Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University Licensing, 23 
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 620, 620 (2007). 
 121. See WALTER D. VALDIVIA, CTR. FOR TECH. INNOVATION AT BROOKINGS, 
UNIVERSITY START-UPS: CRITICAL FOR IMPROVING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 1 
(2013) (noting that the typical tech transfer model is unprofitable for most 
universities); Irene Abrams et al., How Are U.S. Technology Transfer Offices 
Tasked and Motivated—Is It All About the Money?, 17 RES. MGMT. REV. 18, 18 
(2009); Brian J. Love, Do University Patents Pay off? Evidence from a Survey 
of University Inventors in Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, 16 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 285, 286 (2014); Thursby & Thursby, supra note 120, at 
622. 
 122. See Lorelai Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress: Are Universities 
Adding to the Cost?, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1373, 1412 (2007). 
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so allow the university to demonstrate that they are in some 
sense earning their keep, pursuing licensing business opportu-
nities as a funding source, and not simply sponging off the lar-
gess of the taxpayers or of private donors. Thus university pa-
tenting and patent licensing may serve a largely ceremonial 
function, even if such programs seem irrational from the per-
spective of actual revenue generation. 
The concept of loose coupling seems apparent in numerous 
other patent settings. The great patent scandal of the early 
twenty-first century has been the rise of firms known variously 
as “non-practicing entities” (NPEs), “patent assertion entities” 
(PAEs), or pejoratively as “patent trolls.”123 These firms acquire 
a large portfolio of unused dormant patents, and then actively 
license and enforce them for revenue, as their primary business 
activity.124 This practice has created not only an extensive criti-
cal scholarly literature, but an enormous outcry among other 
affected businesses in the information and communication sec-
tor.125 This has prompted reaction from both the judiciary and 
from Congress. Patent trolling appears to be directly responsi-
ble for a number of judicial changes in patent doctrine and pro-
cedure, and is also substantially responsible for the extensive 
legislative overhaul of the patent statute that took effect in 
2013.126 
The most striking feature of this patent phenomenon is 
that these PAEs have deployed patents in precisely the way 
that patents were supposedly intended to be used, and in the 
way that, as previously mentioned, has been puzzlingly absent 
from the vast majority of patents issued: patents held by 
“trolls” are actually licensed and enforced. Indeed, the acquisi-
tion and assertion of patent portfolios by trolls takes seriously 
the pervasive trope in patent parlance that these are property 
rights, like any other property rights, and comparable to the 
 
 123. Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 459 
(2012). 
 124. See Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-
Seeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1588 (2009). 
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Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2009); 
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paradigm of property rights in land.127 The business model 
adopted by PAEs looks in many respects very much like the ac-
quisition and management of tangible property such as real es-
tate portfolios. But actually treating patents as property has 
created an uproar. The patent system appeared to work fairly 
well when patents were largely ceremonial, that is when the 
myth of exclusive rights was only loosely coupled to the actual 
deployment of patents. But when practice began to align with 
the pervasive social narrative of property, the system was 
thrown into crisis. 
Similar evidence of loose coupling may also be extant in the 
biotechnology field. Patent scholars have long noted the poten-
tial for a breakdown of research in the biotechnology area due 
to a crowded field of overlapping patents.128 Biotechnology re-
searchers face a thicket of patents that may constrain their 
freedom to operate, resulting in a potential “anti-commons” in 
which research and development could grind to a standstill due 
to the necessity of clearing multiple licenses. Puzzlingly, de-
spite the presence of densely overlapping patents, biotechnolo-
gy research has gone forward—much of the anticipated thicket 
has now been cleared by recent Supreme Court jurispru-
dence129—but there was little evidence of deterred research be-
 
 127. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108 (1990) (drawing parallels between intellectual 
property and tangible property); David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the 
Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. 652 (2010) (advocating the comparison of in-
tellectual and real property); Richard A. Epstein, Professor, Univ. of Chi., Re-
marks at the Aspen Summit: The Structural Unity of Real and Intellectual 
Property (Aug. 21, 2006) (transcript available in Release 13.24 from The Pro-
gress & Freedom Foundation) (discussing the strong similarities between in-
tellectual property and other types of property). But see Julie E. Cohen, Prop-
erty as Institutions for Resources: Lessons from and for IP, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1, 
32–56 (2015) (distinguishing characteristics of intellectual property from other 
categories of property); Mark A. Lemley Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications 
for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 141–48 (2006) (discussing the 
fallacious comparison of intellectual property to real property).  
 128. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter In-
novation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698–
99 (1998). 
 129. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2107 (2013) (holding that naturally occurring genomic DNA patents comprise 
ineligible subject matter). 
  
448 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:421 
 
fore the court’s intervention.130 Several studies investigating 
this lack of a biotechnology anti-commons effect have shown 
that the predicted crisis failed to emerge, not due to any clear-
ance or withdrawal of the threatening patents, but rather be-
cause researchers simply ignore them.131 
Such studies show the narrative of biotechnology patenting 
is not merely loosely coupled, but almost entirely uncoupled 
from actual practice. Conventional narratives regarding inno-
vation, and biotechnology in particular, tell us that strong pa-
tent rights are essential to the development of a robust tech-
nical sector, characterized by small start-up firms.132 In 
practice, however, we find that the majority of such patents are 
neither licensed nor enforced, allowing necessary, but poten-
tially infringing, research to proceed. And, as in the case of the 
public school study previously described, or as I have suggested 
is the case for patent trolling, one similarly suspects that the 
re-coupling of narrative and practice in biotechnology, to en-
force and license the patents, would result in enormous disrup-
tion to the furtherance of biomedical research. 
B. INSTITUTIONALIZED PATENT LAW 
As described above, one of the most active areas of current 
new institutional inquiry examines how institutionalized prac-
tices within organizational fields shape the content and mean-
ing of formal law.133 One would expect that patent law, too, has 
been profoundly shaped by the institutionalized practices of the 
patent field. Patent law is a relatively insular area of practice, 
encompassing a highly specialized appellate court that hears 
patent cases, a specialized federal agency that reviews and 
grants patent applications, and a specialized cadre of legal 
practitioners with their own distinctive credentials and associa-
tions.134 Lobbying, favoritism, and “capture” of governmental 
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patent actors such as the United States Patent Office, the Con-
gressional committees covering patents, and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit, are a constant concern. But the 
question here is less the conscious legalization of preferential 
treatment—although that certainly may play a role in organi-
zational practice—than the incorporation of routine, habitual, 
unremarkable background assumptions of the field into formal 
law. 
It is likely, then, that expectations within the field—
expectations of patent attorneys, patent owners, patent licen-
sors and licenses—have over time become formally incorpo-
rated into the legal regime. There are undoubtedly myriad ex-
amples of such “bottom up” or “endogenous” institutional 
additions to patent law, but I will offer here only one illustra-
tive historical example. Modern patent documents end with a 
series of numbered sentences called “claims” that are intended 
to delineate the technological boundaries of the inventor’s pa-
tent rights.135 But patents did not always include claims. Early 
nineteenth-century patents consisted only of what we would 
now term the disclosure portion of the document.136 Then, in re-
sponse to court decisions invalidating patents that seemed to 
encompass old technology, patent drafters began to break out 
as a separate sentence an explicit statement identifying the 
novel portion of the invention.137 This was not a substitute for 
the description, nor was it formally required; it was merely a 
textual device intended to highlight and distinctly state what 
was novel. 
Including such separate statements in patent applications 
became common practice among patent professionals, then be-
came an expected feature of the patent, and then in the mid-
nineteenth century became formally required by statute as part 
of the patent document.138 Today patent claims are not merely 
expected, they are required as a matter of statute.139 And in the 
interim, they have become central to patent practice. An exten-
 
 135. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW 
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sive body of doctrine and practice has grown up around the 
drafting of claims, the structure of claims, and the interpreta-
tion of claims.140 The administrative process of patent procure-
ment largely revolves around the formal proposal and approval 
of claim text;141 similarly, the judicial process of patent en-
forcement largely revolves around the construction and appli-
cation of claim text.142 The pervasive incorporation of claiming 
into patent law thus indicates how institutionalization of a le-
gal drafting practice can come to shape the field. 
  CONCLUSION   
I conclude with a few words regarding the significance and 
possible direction of the suggestions I have made here. The new 
institutional approaches that I have suggested allow for a con-
versation about the mythology of patent law even though they 
reject, or at least circumnavigate, the economic incentive para-
digm for patents. This is not an unfamiliar path for legal schol-
arship, although it may be novel for the patent field. New insti-
tutionalism has for the last two decades been a fixture of the 
“law and society” school of hybrid legal and sociological analy-
sis,143 having been deployed both theoretically and empirically 
to examine a wide range of legal institutions.144 But there has to 
date been no extension of its tenets to consideration of the pa-
tent system; for that matter, sociological analysis of any kind 
directed toward the patent system has been a rarity.145 
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I have suggested here several likely areas for application of 
new institutional analysis, and I have primarily engaged the 
literature on social scripts or tropes, focusing primarily on the 
cognitive strand of research. I have not discussed here the rest 
of the “three pillars” of new institutionalism,146 such as coercive 
or normative influences, but they likely offer similarly attrac-
tive sites of patent research, and I would anticipate lines of 
productive scholarship investigating instances where these in-
fluences intersect.147 In some instances the influence of one or 
another of these sources may be more pointed or pervasive. 
Certainly the coercive or regulatory pressures generated by the 
patent system should play an important role in organizational 
structures, perhaps where organizations anticipate litigation. 
For example, I have noted above that virtually all U.S. re-
search universities have technology transfer offices and sug-
gested they have ceremonial explanation for their continued ex-
istence.148 But that explanation surely does not operate in 
isolation. To some extent the proliferation of such offices may 
be simply mimetic, due to imitation of other research universi-
ties that have instituted technology transfer offices. And to a 
substantial degree, implementation of such offices is regulatory 
or coercive, due to the opportunities and requirements for own-
ership of patented technologies arising from federally funded 
research, imposed under the Bayh-Dole Act and the Stevenson 
Technology Transfer Act.149 
Overall what I have proposed of course is an extended hy-
pothesis that requires empirical verification. This may also 
chart a path unfamiliar to patent scholarship; verification or 
refutation of my suggestions lies in the kind of “thick” descrip-
tive ethnography that has been largely lacking in patent stud-
ies.150 While empirical studies of the patent system are all the 
rage, most of what has been done to date tends to simply quan-
tify activity, without tying the numbers generated to any 
 
 146. See SCOTT, supra note 38, at 33–52 (deploying the terminology of 
“three pillars” for new institutional scholarship). 
 147. For an initial foray into the normative structure of patenting, see 
Hubbard, supra note 107. 
 148. See supra notes 118–21 and accompanying text. 
 149. See Thursby & Thursby, supra note 119. 
 150. Here Jessica Silbey’s ethnographic study of creativity and innovation 
offers a welcome exception. JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, 
INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2015). 
  
452 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:421 
 
broader social theory or framework.151 As Jessica Silbey has 
pointed out, such studies may give us little sense of what is ac-
tually occurring in the intellectual property system, because 
they are not formulated to do so.152 They neither look for evi-
dence of established social frameworks, nor attempt to formu-
late new frameworks within which the social action of intellec-
tual property law might be generally understood.153 
Application of new institutional analysis along the lines I 
have suggested offers not a justification for intellectual proper-
ty regimes, but an explanation as to how they are functioning. 
Justifications, particularly the evidentiary justifications that 
most interest Professor Lemley, might need to wait for explana-
tion. The most sensible way forward may be to simply accept 
that patents have settled into particular social roles as part of 
the ecology of business and technical innovation. We can then 
begin to determine just what role patents are playing. This may 
in turn lead to some discussion of whether those roles are a 
good thing or a bad thing, but the first order of business is to 
follow patents in action and build some understanding of their 
social function. 
This stance is entirely pragmatic, and largely agnostic with 
regard to the social value of patents. The patents are there, 
they are doing something, and given the time and effort invest-
ed in them, whatever they are doing is obviously of enormous 
significance to the communities that surround them. Patents 
may or may not be justified on grounds of efficiency, fairness, 
virtue, or any other conceivable criterion. But taking the patent 
system as a given, which in the foreseeable future is unlikely to 
either disappear or to undergo radical change, allows us to fo-
cus on how, rather than why the system is operating, and opens 
the field for sustained inquiry on the sociology of patenting. 
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